Can a party seek to delay the publication of a final judgment in the Cayman Islands?

The Grand Court’s judgment in Jafar v Abraaj Holdings [2025] CIGC (FSD) 69 confirms that delaying publication of final judgments after an open trial will be truly exceptional.

Segal J dismissed an application to embargo reasons on liability and quantum, restated the strong constitutional and common law presumption of prompt, full publication, and outlined the narrow route for any short stay whilst an appellant approaches the Court of Appeal.

What are the three key takeaways of the decision?

For Cayman litigants, the decision crystallises a clear, workable framework:

1. First, it entrenches the constitutional priority of open justice under section 7 of the Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009 that reasons should be published on hand‑down following an open trial, with derogations confined to strictly necessary, tightly‑tailored orders;

    

2. Second, the judgment sits squarely within and consolidates existing Cayman case law which all emphasise the narrowness of exceptions and the strong presumption of publication;

    

3. Third, the judgment clarifies that general reputational or commercial concerns without cogent evidence of exceptional, irreparable harm beyond the ordinary incidents of open proceedings will not suffice. More specifically, the Grand Court held that where secrecy is genuinely essential (i.e. trade secrets, safety, informants), it must be raised early, evidenced, and crafted no more intrusively than necessary.

What application was before the Court?

Following the circulation of a 782‑page draft judgment under the usual embargo, the plaintiff sought to 'seal and keep confidential' the final judgment until 30 days after any notice of appeal, alongside ancillary sealing orders. The defendants agreed to seal the application materials but opposed any delay to publication. The hearing was held in private by consent under Grand Court Rules, Order 32.

What were the plaintiff's arguments for delaying publication?

The plaintiff advanced a two‑track case:

1. First, on the merits, the plaintiff submitted immediate publication would cause serious, irreparable reputational and commercial harm to him and two non‑parties (including a principal witness and his son), exacerbated by the risk of sensationalised or selective media reporting and third‑party 'weaponisation' of findings in parallel commercial, regulatory, or travel‑restriction contexts; and

    

2. Second, procedurally, the plaintiff invoked a limited 'holding the ring' jurisdiction by analogy with interim injunctions pending appeal contending that a short, time‑boxed embargo was needed so that an intended Court of Appeal application for confidentiality and case‑management orders would not be rendered nugatory.

How did the defendants respond?

The defendants submitted in response that the trial and most materials had been public, that section 7 of the Cayman Islands Constitution requires open justice save in tightly circumscribed cases, and that a six‑week blackout was not de minimis. The defendants also emphasised concrete prejudice to fund investors and market participants from opacity around reasons and argued that any legitimate sensitivities could be addressed by narrowly‑tailored measures short of suppressing the judgment.

What legal framework did the Court apply?

In its judgment, the Grand Court reaffirmed the orthodox position that reasons are to be published publicly, save for limited exceptions, and that presumption is strongest after a public trial when reasons are ready for hand‑down, reflecting section 7 of the Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009 and, in particular, s.7(9) (giving reasons publicly) and s.7(10)(a)–(b) (permitting limited departures for interlocutory/chambers hearings and specified public interests).

What reasons drove the Court's decision?

Three points drove the result: (i) a 'very strong presumption' of publication after an open trial, displaced only in extreme cases; (ii) reputational and commercial fallout are the ordinary incidents of open justice and that public vindication appropriately comes on appeal, not via secrecy; and (iii) limited derogations, such as safety or true commercial ruin, require clear, compelling evidence and the narrowest tailoring which the Court held were all absent in this case.

Does the judgment change the law and what is its practical significance?

Notably, the Grand Court’s judgment in Jafar v Abraaj Holdings does not extend the law but rather it consolidates and clarifies the approach to open justice and articulates a coherent, Cayman-specific framework. In that regard, and in line with Maples Corporate Services Ltd v CIMA, it emphasises prompt, full publication of final judgments after open hearings, permitting only a short, practical stay to enable an urgent appellate approach. Equally, and consistent with AHAB v SICL, Sphinx and Fortuna, Segal J held that secrecy is reserved for truly exceptional, strictly necessary cases, and recent practice continues to favour targeted, minimal measures-such as anonymisation, redaction and confidentiality clubs-over wholesale suppression.

Walkers acted for the Second and Third Defendants. The Walkers team advising on the matter was led by Matthew Goucke (Partner) and Shelley White (Partner) with support from Jonathan Turner (Senior Counsel), Patrick McConvey (Senior Counsel), Laure-Astrid Wigglesworth (Associate), Charlotte Raynor (Associate) and Florence Allan (Associate). Walkers appeared with Mark Simpson KC and Sarah Tresman and were instructed by Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.