Rupert Morris
Partner
Guernsey
Apr 29, 2026

In modern Guernsey trust practice, trustees are commonly vested with both a power of advancement and a power of appointment. These powers are often described in similar language, exercised in similar circumstances and supported by similarly broad drafting, which can lead practitioners to treat them as interchangeable tools for effecting distributions from trust capital. That assumption is understandable, but it is also risky. Although both powers enable trustees to confer benefits from trust property, they rest on different legal foundations, serve different structural purposes and carry different sensitivities when scrutinised after the event.
This article revisits the distinction between these two powers through the lens of Guernsey law and argues that the choice between them matters. Using the wrong power can expose trustees to unnecessary challenge, particularly in complex discretionary structures or where distributions materially reshape the beneficial landscape of the trust.
A defining feature of Guernsey trust law is its emphasis on the primacy of the trust instrument. The Trusts (Guernsey) Law, 2007 (as amended) (the 'Trust Law') provides a modern and highly enabling statutory framework, but it consistently operates in many aspects subject to the terms of the trust. Questions such as who may benefit, how broadly a power may be exercised and what procedural safeguards apply cannot be answered by reference to doctrine alone, they must be answered by reference to the trust instrument.
The statutory context nevertheless remains important. In Guernsey, the statutory power of appointment is deliberately framed in expansive terms. Section 49 of the Trust Law provides that the terms of a trust may confer on the settlor, the trustees or any other person a power to appoint or assign all or any of the trust property, or any interest in it, to or for the benefit of any person, whether or not that person was a beneficiary of the trust immediately prior to the appointment or assignment. This formulation confirms that, as a matter of Guernsey law, the exercise of a power of appointment is not conceptually dependent upon the appointee holding any pre-existing beneficial interest in the trust property. The appointment itself is capable of creating that beneficial interest. This is an important point because it distinguishes the Guernsey position from any suggestion that a power of appointment can only operate to select among, or vary the interests of, persons who already possess some form of beneficial entitlement. Under Section 49 of the Trust Law, the terms of a trust may confer a power to appoint to any person and that person need not be within a defined class of existing beneficiaries at the time of appointment.
By way of illustration, consider a Guernsey discretionary trust established for the benefit of a widely-defined class comprising the settlor’s descendants and their spouses. The trust instrument confers on the trustees a broad power of appointment in line with Section 49 of the Trust Law. At the date of the settlement, the settlor has two adult children, A and B, neither of whom is married. Some years later, A marries C. The trustees wish to make provision for C and for any future children of the marriage. Although C falls within the class of beneficiaries, C has no vested or contingent interest in the trust property and has never received any distribution. The trustees exercise their power of appointment by instrument, appointing that a specified portion of the trust fund shall henceforth be held on discretionary trusts for the benefit of A, C and any children of A and C born or adopted during the trust period. This appointment creates entirely new beneficial interests where none previously existed. C and the as-yet unborn children of A and C become objects of the discretionary trust solely by virtue of the appointment. The power of appointment has thus been used not to redistribute existing entitlements, but to bring into existence a new layer of beneficial provision, tailored to the family’s changed circumstances. Had the trust instrument been more narrowly drawn, for example, confining the class of potential appointees to the settlor’s children only, the trustees could not have appointed in favour of C. This illustrates the importance of careful drafting of both the power of appointment and the definition of beneficiaries in the trust instrument.
By contrast, the power of advancement carries heavier historical baggage. In its traditional English form, the power of advancement was conceived as a mechanism by which trustees could anticipate the vesting in possession of a beneficiary's capital interest, raising money on account of that interest and applying it for the beneficiary's benefit in advance of the time at which it would otherwise fall into possession. On that orthodox view, the power was dependent on a pre-existing vested or contingent interest and its purpose was acceleration rather than creation.
Modern Guernsey trust instruments frequently depart from that narrow concept. Advancement clauses are now commonly drafted in terms that permit trustees to apply capital for the "advancement or benefit" of beneficiaries, often without reference to shares or expectant interests. In discretionary trusts, the language used may be indistinguishable, in practical effect, from a power of appointment. It is therefore unsurprising that trustees may view advancement as a convenient and flexible distribution tool, particularly for one-off capital payments or welfare-driven applications.
However, even in Guernsey, where the statutory framework is permissive and drafting is typically expansive, the traditional DNA of advancement still matters. The key practitioner question is not whether Guernsey law permits broad advancement powers, it does, but whether, on the terms of the particular trust instrument, the advancement power is properly construed as a freestanding dispositive power or whether it remains tethered, expressly or by implication, to an existing interest framework.
It is important to recognise that when the power of advancement in a trust is drafted broadly, trustees can use it not only to distribute capital to beneficiaries, but also to set up new trusts for their benefit. This process is called "settled advancement". However, while both settled advancement and the power of appointment can create new trusts, they operate differently.
As Kessler explains in the English law context1 (which is equally applicable to Guernsey law), the power of advancement may be used to transfer trust property to a new trust where it may be held on terms wholly or partly different from the original trust, or to alter the terms of the existing trust so as to create new beneficial interests which may wholly or partly replace the existing beneficial interests.
It is quite common for trustees, when having the power to advance funds for the benefit of an object, Z, to do so by way of a settled advancement. In this arrangement, the trust assets are held on trust for Z during their lifetime, with the remainder passing to Z’s family after Z’s death. The advancement must be made with Z’s benefit in mind and it is clear that structuring it in this way counts as applying the trust fund for Z’s benefit - especially since it is generally considered beneficial if Z’s family stands to benefit from the trust after Z’s passing. Therefore, this power allows trustees to create beneficial interests, but these must always be for the benefit of the particular object, Z. This is an important distinction: while a typical power of appointment lets trustees create any form of trust as long as the beneficiaries fall within the class of objects, a settled advancement is limited to creating new trusts that are specifically designed to benefit the intended object.
1 J Kessler KC, Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts: A Modern Approach, 15 Ed, Chapter 11 – Drafting Overriding Powers (Appointment, Re-Settlement and Advancement)
2Ibid.
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